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these regions reﬂ  ect the motivational salience of cued stimuli (i.e., 
imperative for action) or the affective properties of the anticipated 
reward (i.e., valence)? And, is anticipatory activation modulated 
by decreases in motivational salience if magnitude and valence 
are held constant? To address these questions we examined brain 
activation during anticipation of rewards that varied in valence 
and in personal relevance. Decreased personal relevance should 
reduce – but not eliminate – motivational salience, while leaving 
magnitude and valence unchanged.
HOW DOES VTA CONTRIBUTE TO REWARD ANTICIPATION 
AND LEARNING?
The neural mechanisms that underlie motivation depend on activ-
ity of neurons in the NAcc (Wise, 1980, 2004; Kalivas et al., 2005; 
Berridge, 2007; Salamone et al., 2007), which are themselves modu-
late by dopaminergic producing neurons in the VTA (Swanson, 
1982; Ikemoto, 2007). While much is known about VTA function 
from single-unit recordings in non-human animals, there have been 
relatively few neuroimaging studies that report effects in the VTA, 
largely because of technical constraints. The VTA is a small nucleus 
within the midbrain, and its boundaries with adjacent nuclei are not 
readily visible on standard structural magnetic resonance images. 
Researchers targeting the VTA, therefore, have used a combination 
of anatomical region-of-interest (ROI) analyses and targeted pulse 
sequences (e.g., inferior slices, tilted orientation). As one initial 
example, research by Adcock et al. (2006) evaluated the   potential 
INTRODUCTION
Neural representations of anticipated reward value are core to mod-
els of the mechanisms for learning (Schultz et al., 1997; Sutton 
and Barto, 1998; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Seymour et al., 2004) and 
decision making (Montague and Berns, 2002; Bayer and Glimcher, 
2005; Balleine et al., 2007; Rangel et al., 2008). These models asso-
ciate predictive cues with their subsequent outcomes, in order to 
describe behavior. Accordingly, the subjective experience of the 
cue-outcome association prior to the occurrence of the outcome 
reﬂ  ects “anticipation”.
The most common functional neuroimaging paradigms for 
studying reward anticipation use learned cue-response-outcome 
contingencies (Delgado et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2001, 2005). 
On each trial an initial cue indicates a potential reward (e.g., a 
monetary gain). Then, following a short delay, a target appears, 
and if participants respond sufﬁ  ciently quickly and/or accurately, 
they receive a reward. Studies using variants of this approach have 
demonstrated that the ventral striatum (vSTR), particularly its 
nucleus accumbens (NAcc), exhibits increases in blood oxygena-
tion level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (hereafter, “activation”) to 
anticipated rewards (Knutson et al., 2000; Ernst et al., 2005; Adcock 
et al., 2006; Knutson and Gibbs, 2007; Dillon et al., 2008). Yet, 
despite the prevalence of this approach, several important questions 
about reward anticipation remain incompletely answered: How do 
these ﬁ  ndings generalize to other regions within the dopaminergic 
system (e.g., the ventral tegmental area, VTA)? Does activation of 
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modulatory role of VTA in shaping memory,   demonstrating 
 speciﬁ  cally improved recall for stimuli associated with greater 
potential rewards. Using a combination of standard regression 
analyses and functional connectivity measures, they found that 
voxels within the anatomical location of VTA both increased in 
activation to larger potential rewards and exhibited functional con-
nectivity with the hippocampus in effective memory formation.
More recently, D’Ardenne et al. (2008) describe VTA responses 
to the experience of primary and secondary rewards, as a func-
tional neuroimaging analog of the prediction error signals previ-
ously reported in single-unit recordings (Ljungberg et al., 1992; 
Schultz et al., 1997; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005). They found that 
VTA activation increased to unexpected rewards, both primary 
(liquid) and secondary (money), consistent with single-unit stud-
ies showing that its neurons convey a positive reward prediction 
error. Of note, D’Ardenne et al. found no signiﬁ  cant changes in 
VTA activation to the omission of an expected liquid reward nor to 
an unexpected monetary loss, as would be expected if that region 
also signaled negative reward prediction errors. Where imaging 
volumes have allowed, some prior studies have reported qualita-
tively similar results in both NAcc and midbrain (Knutson et al., 
2005) and NAcc and VTA (Moll et al., 2006), although a systematic 
comparison is needed.
WHAT DOES NEURAL ACTIVITY DURING REWARD 
ANTICIPATION REPRESENT?
Understanding how the brain encodes, represents, and manipulates 
signals that indicate potential and experienced rewards has been 
an area of considerable basic (Montague and Berns, 2002; Bayer 
and Glimcher, 2005; Phillips et al., 2007; Delgado et al., 2008a,b, 
Knutson and Greer, 2008) and clinical research (Kilts et al., 2001; 
Grusser et al., 2004; Kienast and Heinz, 2006; Bjork et al., 2008; 
Knutson et al., 2008a, Schlagenhauf et al., 2008; Scott et al., 2008; 
Strohle et al., 2008; Pizzagalli et al., 2009). The common thread in 
this extensive literature is that the neural representation of reward 
does not reﬂ  ect any simple unitary construct. In particular, there 
has been an ongoing debate about whether and how the brain 
represents two different aspects of reward. The ﬁ  rst aspect is the 
absolute value of the outcome (i.e., important vs. unimportant 
outcomes), referred to as energization (Elliot, 2006), salience (Zink 
et al., 2003), incentive salience (Berridge et al., 2009), and magni-
tude (Knutson et al., 2001). A second aspect differentiates positive 
from negative outcomes; this aspect has been described in terms 
of affect (Knutson and Greer, 2008), valence, and approach/avoid-
ance (Elliot, 2006). In the current paper, we will refer to these two 
aspects, which we intended to manipulate separately, as motivation 
and affective valence.
In the inﬂ  uential framework advanced by Berridge and col-
leagues, there are functional and neural dissociations between the 
valenced and non-valenced aspects of reward (Berridge, 2004; 
Berridge et al., 2009). Speciﬁ  cally, these authors contend that the 
response of dopaminergic neurons in the VTA and NAcc reﬂ  ect 
a motivational signal associated with information about future 
rewards (i.e., “wanting” the reward). In contrast, other neurotrans-
mitters (e.g., opioids) affect the valence component of reward [i.e., 
“liking” the reward (Wise, 1980)]; they make pleasurable stimuli 
more pleasurable and aversive experiences less aversive (Pecina 
and Berridge, 2005). These potentially dissociable concepts  – 
 motivational  signiﬁ  cance and affective valence – recur in func-
tional neuroimaging studies of reward anticipation and experience, 
although some reports discuss activation in these brain regions 
from the perspective of approach/avoidance behavior (Elliot, 2006), 
others invoke changes in affect evoked by rewards (Knutson and 
Greer, 2008), and still others consider responses in these regions 
as markers of prediction error [both valenced and non-valenced 
(O’Doherty et al., 2004; Seymour et al., 2007)].
Despite this ongoing debate, motivation and affective valence 
can be difﬁ  cult to tease apart experimentally. Rewards in neur-
oeconomic research are commonly monetary gains implemented 
in paradigms where they have both motivational signiﬁ  cance and 
affective valence. The resulting activation in NAcc, VTA, or other 
reward-related regions may thus be attributed to either motiva-
tion or valence. Some reports indicate that stimuli of similar moti-
vational signiﬁ  cance but different valence (e.g., monetary gains 
and losses) evoke similar activation in reward-related regions. For 
example, Cooper and Knutson (2008) show that when an outcome 
is uncertain, activation in the NAcc increases for both gain and loss 
anticipation. Other studies have suggested that activation in some 
components of the reward system does indeed depend on valence, 
whether because of distinct spatial loci evoked by positive and 
negative stimuli (Seymour et al., 2007) or because of decreases in 
activation to negative events (Breiter et al., 2001). Tom et al. (2007) 
tracked parametric effects of gain and loss magnitudes in a loss-
aversion paradigm, and found that activation in regions including 
the vSTR increased with magnitude for decisions about potential 
gains and decreased with magnitude for potential losses. Based 
on these and other conﬂ  icts in the literature, how motivation and 
affective valence information interact within the multiple regions 
that constitute the reward system remains unknown.
ARE THE NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF OUTCOME ANTICIPATION 
SIMILAR WHEN PLAYING FOR SELF AND OTHERS?
Finally, there exists considerable evidence that anticipatory acti-
vation, at least in the NAcc, generalizes across a wide range of 
rewards. Most neuroimaging studies of reward have used monetary 
outcomes, typically repeated opportunities to gain or lose about 
a dollar (Knutson et al., 2001; Daw, 2007). Yet, similar patterns 
of NAcc activation can be evoked using ﬂ  uid rewards (Valentin 
et al., 2007), food items (Hare et al., 2008, 2009), valuable consumer 
goods (Knutson et al., 2007, 2008b), social cooperation (Rilling 
et al., 2002), and even the opportunity to punish others (Singer 
et al., 2006). Recent studies have related the increases in NAcc acti-
vation preceding a decision to the value of rewards earned for others 
(Moll et al., 2006; Harbaugh et al., 2007). Based on these studies, 
one natural conclusion is that any anticipated reward, even one 
with reduced personal relevance (and thus motivational salience), 
would evoke activation in multiple regions within the reward sys-
tem (e.g., NAcc and VTA). While plausible, this conjecture has not 
yet been demonstrated.
OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT EXPERIMENT
In the current study, we manipulated the valence (i.e., gain vs. loss) 
and motivational relevance (i.e., oneself vs. charity as beneﬁ  ciary) of 
anticipated rewards, using an incentive-compatible response-time Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 21  |  3
Carter et al.  Reward anticipation
game modeled on common paradigms in the literature (Knutson 
et al., 2000, 2001). In these paradigms, the trial cue is the earliest 
possible predictor of the potential gain or loss, and thus initiates 
anticipation. We focus on reward anticipation, rather than reward 
outcome, because the motivational and affective explanations for 
reward-system activation make clear and opposing predictions. If 
motivational inﬂ  uences alone drive activation during anticipation, 
and if manipulating the beneﬁ  ciary of the reward changes the moti-
vational salience (Mobbs et al., 2009), then gain- and loss-related 
activation should be positively correlated across individuals, with 
greater responses observed to self- compared to other-directed out-
comes. Conversely, if affective valence alone determines anticipatory 
activation, activation should be greatest when playing for gains and 
least when playing to avoid losses (relative to neutral outcomes), but 
with no differences between Self and Charity treatments. Moreover, 
by assessing participants’ reward sensitivity and other-regarding 
preferences, we obtained independent predictors of individual dif-
ferences in the neural responses to each reward type.
This paradigm can also test predictions of temporal difference 
(TD) models of anticipatory association. According to common TD 
models (Sutton and Barto, 1990), a well-learned reward cue should 
evoke activation that reﬂ  ects the value of the expected outcome. 
This prediction error signal can be described in terms of the value 
of the associated outcome (i.e., valenced) or the association value 
(i.e., the strength of the prediction), as discussed further below. In 
the case where prediction error is valenced, a pattern similar to the 
valence interpretation of anticipation would be expected: positive 
for gains, negative for losses. In the case where prediction error 
mirrors the strength of the association a result similar to the moti-
vational salience signal model would be expected: positive for both 
gains and losses, with neutral cues producing the least activation. 
Importantly, both prediction error accounts would dictate identical 
results in charity and self conditions, unless the predictive system 
also represented the motivational signiﬁ  cance of the cues.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty young adults (mean age 24 years; range 19–29 years; 
10 females) participated in this study. Two were excluded because 
of misalignments in acquisition coverage, and one was excluded 
due to a Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) score indicating depres-
sion, leaving 17 participants in the reported data. All participants 
provided informed consent under a protocol approved by the Duke 
Medical Center Internal Review Board.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The experimental session comprised initial selection of a charity, 
task training outside the scanner, an fMRI session using a reward 
anticipation task, and completion of questionnaires to assess reward 
attitudes.
Following informed consent, subjects read descriptions of four 
non-proﬁ  t organizations – Easter Seals, Durham Literacy Center, 
Animal Protection Society, and the American Red Cross – and then 
selected one as their charitable target. They were then provided 
full information about the task structure and payment contingen-
cies (see below for task details), and were told that no deception 
was used in the experiment. All participants reported that they 
understood the task procedures and that they believed that their 
earnings for charity would go to the selected target. Before entering 
the scanner, they completed one practice run of the task using only 
gain trials. We separated gain trials and loss trials into different 
runs, to minimize cue conﬂ  ict. Then, the participants were taken 
to the scanner for the MRI session. During acquisition of initial 
structural images, each participant completed a second practice run 
(using only loss trials). Participants then completed four 7-min task 
runs during collection of fMRI data. The ﬁ  rst run always involved 
monetary gains, so that subjects built up balances within cumula-
tive banks, and the second run always involved monetary losses. 
The last two runs consisted of one gain run and one loss run, with 
their order randomly determined.
Each run consisted of 50 trials (Figure 1), evenly split between 
ﬁ  ve conditions according to potential outcome: Self $4, Charity $4, 
Self $0, Charity $0, and Neutral Control $0. Every trial began with 
a 500-ms cue whose composition indicated the target (picture), 
monetary amount at stake [background color: red (Self) or blue 
(Charity) for $4, yellow for $0 control conditions], and valence 
(gain: square frame, loss: circular frame). Following a variable delay 
of between 4 and 4.5 s, a target appeared on the screen. The subject’s 
task was to respond by pressing a button with the index ﬁ  nger of 
the right hand, before the target disappeared. Within gain runs, 
responses that were sufﬁ  ciently fast added $4 to the subject’s or 
charity’s bank (visually indicated by a coin), and responses that 
were longer than the current threshold had no ﬁ  nancial conse-
quences (visually indicated by a ‘0’). Within loss runs, responses 
that were sufﬁ  ciently fast resulted in no ﬁ  nancial consequences 
(visually indicated by a ‘0’), whereas responses that were longer 
than the current threshold subtracted $4 from the subject’s or chari-
ty’s bank (visually indicated by a red circle with a diagonal line). 
The presentation time of the target was determined by an adaptive 
algorithm; using information about response times on previous 
similar trials, the algorithm estimated the response time threshold 
at which the subject would be successful on approximately 65% 
of trials. We emphasize that independent thresholds were used for 
each trial type.
At the end of all runs, the participants exited the scanner and 
completed a series of behavioral questionnaires (see below). 
Participants were paid a base sum of $15. In addition, cumulative 
bank totals were calculated for both the participant (M $22.35, SD 
11.75) and charity (M $22.59, SD $6.62), and participants were paid 
the full amount of their bank in cash (participants were guaranteed 
a minimum of $40 for participation). Following completion of data 
collection from all subjects, the researchers paid the cumulative 
earnings to each charity.
BEHAVIORAL QUESTIONNAIRES
After completing the experiment, participants were asked to ﬁ  ll out 
a series of psychological questionnaires. These included: the BDI 
(a screening tool for depression) (Beck et al., 1961); Behavioral 
Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System (BIS/BAS, an 
index of approach and avoidance tendencies) (Carver and White, 
1994); Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, an assessment of other-
regarding behavior) (Davis, 1983); Personal Altruism Level (PAL, 
a questionnaire using indices of other-regarding personal efforts) 
(Tankersley et al., 2007); Self Report Altruism Scale (SRAS, an index Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 21  |  4
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size: 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm). We also collected 17 slice IR-SPGR 
images, coplanar with the BOLD contrast images described below, 
for use in registration and normalization.
We collected BOLD contrast images acquired using a standard 
echo-planar sequence on a 3T GE Signa MRI scanner. Each of the 
four runs comprised 416 volumes (TR: 1 s; TE: 27 ms; Flip angle: 
77°; voxel size: 3.75 mm × 3.75 mm × 3.8 mm) of 17 axial slices posi-
tioned to provide coverage of the midbrain and striatum (Figure 2). 
A TR of 1 s, and consequently a smaller acquisition volume, was 
chosen to increase the sampling rate in our ROIs (NAcc and VTA). 
We note that the GE Signa EPI sequence automatically passes images 
through a Fermi ﬁ  lter with a transition width of 10 mm and radius 
of half the matrix size, which resulted in an effective smoothing 
kernel of approximately 4.8 mm3. Thus, we did not include addi-
tional smoothing as part of our preprocessing protocol. Following 
reorientation, raw BOLD images were skull stripped using FSL’s BET, 
corrected for intervolume head motion using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson 
et al., 2002), intensity normalized by a single multiplicative factor, 
and subjected to a high-pass temporal ﬁ  lter (Gaussian-weighted 
least-squares straight line ﬁ  tting, with sigma = 50.0 s). Registration 
to high-resolution structural and standard-space images were 
of other-regarding preferences) (Rushton et al., 1981); Temporal 
Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS, an index of reward experi-
ence and anticipation) (Gard et al., 2006). By taking the average 
of Z-score-transformed subscales from these measures, we con-
structed three individual-difference covariates. We deﬁ  ned the 
covariates based on a priori relations between the above scales: a 
personal reward-sensitivity covariate (BAS and TEPS, combined); 
an other-regarding preference covariate (PAL, IRI, and SRAS); and 
a behavioral inhibition covariate (BIS and BDI). A factor analy-
sis presented by Pulos et al. (2004) suggests the personal-distress 
subscale of the IRI, included in our other-regarding preference 
covariate, may differ from the other-regarding trait targeted by 
the rest of the included subscales. Therefore, as a control test, we 
also evaluated a more limited empathy covariate that eliminated 
the personal distress subscale from the IRI.
fMRI ACQUISITION AND PREPROCESSING
At the beginning of the scanning session, we collected initial local-
izer images to identify the participant’s head position within the 
scanner, followed by IR-SPGR high-resolution whole-volume 
T1-weighted images to aid in normalization and registration (voxel 
FIGURE 1 | Participants performed a monetary incentive reaction time task. 
An initial cue marked the start of the trial and indicated whether money was at 
stake and, if so, who would receive it. Each trial offered either $4 or $0, for the 
participant (Self), a charity (Charity), or no one. Gain and loss outcomes occurred 
in separate runs, to minimize cue conﬂ  ict. After a variable wait (4–4.5 s) a 
response target appeared indicating that participants were to press a button 
using their right index ﬁ  nger as quickly as possible. The trial was scored as a hit if 
the participant responded in time or as a miss if they did not. Changes to the 
bank as a result of that trial were then displayed for 0.5 s. In gain runs on $4 
trials, if the subject responded to the target in time they won $4 for themselves 
or a charity, if they missed the trial there was no change to that bank. During loss 
runs on $4 trials, if the subject responded to the target in time there was no 
change to that bank, if they responded too slowly, they lost $4 for either 
themselves or their charity. Control trials resulted in no change to the bank but 
participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible. Reaction time 
thresholds for hits and misses were set using an adaptive algorithm to allow the 
subject to win approximately 65% of the time. Thresholds were set 
independently for each trial type.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 21  |  5
Carter et al.  Reward anticipation
  carried out using FLIRT (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001; Jenkinson 
et al., 2002). All coordinates are reported in MNI space.
fMRI ANALYSIS: GENERAL LINEAR MODEL
All fMRI analyses were carried out using FEAT (FMRI Expert 
Analysis Tool) Version 5.92, part of FSL (FMRIB’s Software Library, 
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Time-series statistical analyses used FILM 
with local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich et al., 2001).
Our ﬁ  rst-level (i.e., within-run) analysis model included ﬁ  ve 
regressors for the anticipation period with two regressors (gain 
and loss) for the outcome period of each trial type. The anticipa-
tion period was modeled as a unit-amplitude response with 1  s 
duration following the disappearance of the trial indicator cue. 
The outcome period was modeled as a unit-amplitude response 
with 1 s duration following the onset of feedback. Trial timing and 
numbers are noted in the task description above. Self $4 trials were 
contrasted against Self $0 trials (and Charity $4 against Charity $0) 
to examine anticipation of gain and loss. The Neutral Control $0 
trials were modeled but not analyzed. Second-level (i.e., across-
run, but within-subject) analyses used a ﬁ  xed-effects model, while 
third-level (i.e., across-subjects) mixed-effects analyses (FLAME 1) 
included the main effects of each regressor from the lower level 
analysis, along with three covariates: reward sensitivity, empathy 
(other regarding preference), and inhibition. Whole-brain analy-
ses used a voxel signiﬁ  cance threshold of z > 2.3 and a cluster-
 signiﬁ  cance threshold of p < 0.05, fully corrected for all voxels in our 
imaging volume (Worsley, 2001). Because clustering algorithms do 
not easily differentiate large areas of activation, Tables 1–4 report 
the top ten peak voxels present using the elevated threshold indi-
cated in each table.
fMRI ANALYSIS: REGIONS OF INTEREST
Our primary analyses used two anatomically deﬁ  ned ROIs: NAcc 
and VTA. Hand drawn anatomical ROIs were identiﬁ  ed based on the 
average of all participant’s normalized high-resolution  anatomical 
images. The NAcc ROIs were drawn in each hemisphere according 
to (Breiter et al., 1997). The VTA ROI was drawn by isolating the 
region medial and anterior to the substantia nigra, following work 
of Adcock et al. (2006). Only ROI voxels that fell within the group 
coverage area were included in the analysis.
FIGURE 2 | Medial surface sagittal image showing overlap of fMRI 
volumes acquired in the 17 included participants.
Table 1 | Self, Gain $4 > Gain $0.
 Peak  (x, y, z)  Z-max
Right intraparietal sulcus  28, −80, 18  5.1
Dorsal striatum  −12, 14, 6  5.05
Ventral striatum  14, 22, −4 5.31
Visual cortex  6, −76, −4 4.95
Left intraparietal sulcus  −26, −84, 18  5.02
Dorsal-medial thalamus  −6, −18, 12  5
Visual cortex  14, −84, 4  5
Dorsal-medial thalamus  −6, −6, 8  4.91
Visual cortex  4, −64, 4  4.94
Visual cortex  16, −84, −4 4.91
Ten maximum cluster peaks, Z-cluster threshold 4.9. Coordinates are millimeters 
in MNI space.
Table 2 | Self, Lose $4 > Lose $0.
 Peak  (x, y, z)  Z-max
Ventral striatum  10, 16, −2 5.29
Striatum  −10, 10, 6  5.26
Left insula/operculum  −36, 14, 8  5.26
Right insula/operculum  38, 14, 8  5.19
Dorsal-medial thalamus  14, −4, 16  5.14
Visual cortex  2, −76, −6 4.91
Left dorsal-medial thalamus  −10, −2, 12  4.88
Left insula/operculum  −44, 12, −2 4.85
Right dorsal-medial thalamus  16, 12, −4 4.86
Visual cortex  6, −84, −4 4.83
Ten maximum cluster peaks, Z-cluster threshold 4.826. Coordinates are 
millimeters in MNI space.
Table 3 | Charity, Gain $4 > Gain $0.
 Peak  (x, y, z)  Z-max
Ventral striatum  12, 16, −2 4.43
Right insula/operculum  32, 20, 8  4.46
Thalamus  −10, −14, 8  4.32
Thalamus 12,  −12, 6  4.37
Midbrain 10,  −12, −6 4.24
Midbrain  −6, −22, −6 4.29
Midbrain 8,  −18, −2 4.31
Ventral striatum  −16, 14, −2 4.32
Dorsal striatum  −8, 14, 0  4.13
Ventral striatum  −18, 20, −2 4.28
Ten maximum cluster peaks, Z-cluster threshold 4.1. Coordinates are millimeters 
in MNI space.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 21  |  6
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RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
The proportion of successful responses (i.e., those faster than 
the adaptive response-time threshold) was similar across all 
four self and charity reward conditions (Self $4: M 64%, SD 7%; 
Charity $4: M 64%, SD 4%; Self $0: M 63%, SD 6%; Charity $0: 
M 62%, SD 5%), indicating that our adaptive algorithm success-
fully matched reward rates. Reaction times to $4 gain trials (M 
208 ms, SD 23 ms) were not signiﬁ  cantly different from reac-
tion times to $4 loss trials (M 207 ms, SD 24 ms). Reaction times 
on $4 trials were faster than $0 trials, and $4 trials played for 
Self were faster than $4 trials played for Charity [2 (beneﬁ  ciary: 
Self vs. Charity) × 2 (magnitude: $4 vs. $0) repeated-measures 
ANOVA; main effect of magnitude: F(1, 16) = 25.7, p < 0.01, $4; 
beneﬁ  ciary × magnitude  interaction:  F(1,16) = 7.5,  p < 0.05); 
paired comparison (M −22 ms, SEM 4 ms, p < 0.001) of $4 (M 
207 ms, SD 23 ms) vs. $0 (M 210 ms, SD 24 ms), p < 0.001; paired 
comparison (M −5ms, SEM 2 ms, p < 0.05) of Self $4 (M 205 ms, 
SD 24 ms) vs. Charity $4 (M 210 ms, SD 23 ms)]. There were no 
signiﬁ  cant differences in reaction times on $0 trials (Self $0: M 
230 ms, SD 28 ms; Charity $0: M 228 ms, SD 23 ms).
fMRI RESULTS: WHOLE-VOLUME ANALYSES
Anticipating gain and loss for self
All analyses reported in this manuscript use regressors associated 
with reward anticipation (i.e., time-locked to the disappearance 
of the initial reward cue). We ﬁ  rst contrasted parameter estimates 
between trials that offered the chance to make $4 and trials where 
no money was at stake (Self-Gain $4 > Self-Gain $0). Activation 
associated with anticipated monetary gains was widely distributed 
throughout the imaged volume (Table 1), with peaks in the dorsal 
striatum and vSTR, bilateral operculum/insula (Figure 3A, top), 
midbrain (Figure 3A, bottom), mediodorsal thalamus, medial pre-
frontal, medial orbitofrontal, anterior pole, and visual cortex. These 
results replicate those found in previous studies of gain anticipation 
(Knutson et al., 2001; Knutson and Greer, 2008).
Next, we conducted a similar analysis for anticipated monetary 
losses, by contrasting trials that offered the chance to avoid losing 
$4 and trials where no money was at stake (Self-Loss $4 vs. Self-
Loss $0). Activations in this loss-anticipation contrast (Table 2) 
were distributed similarly to the gain condition. Peaks of activation 
were also similar to those noted under the gain condition, includ-
ing in the dorsal striatum and vSTR, bilateral operculum/insula 
(Figure 3B, top), midbrain (shown in Figure 3B, bottom), medi-
odorsal thalamus, and orbitofrontal and visual cortex.
The direct contrast between gain and loss anticipation (Self-Gain 
$4 > Self-Loss $4) identiﬁ  ed only one cluster along the inferior pari-
etal sulcus (Z = 3.2; max: 32, −82, 20), and no differential activa-
tion overlapping our ROIs or in other regions implicated in reward 
anticipation by prior literature. No signiﬁ  cant clusters of activation 
were identiﬁ  ed in the reverse contrast (Self-Loss $4 > Self-Gain $4). 
Moreover, no clusters exhibited signiﬁ  cantly decreased activation dur-
ing either self-directed gain or loss trials compared to control trials 
(i.e., Self-Gain $0 > Self-Gain $4, or Self-Loss $0 > Self-Loss $4).
Anticipating gain and loss for charity
We repeated all of the analyses from the previous section for tri-
als that offered the chance to gain or lose money for the selected 
charity. Anticipating potential gains and losses for a charity evoked 
activation in regions within the dorsal striatum and vSTR, mid-
brain, thalamus, prefrontal cortex, bilateral insula, and visual 
cortex. Note that there was very good match between the peak 
loci of activation for self-directed and charity-directed rewards 
(Tables 3 and 4). Direct contrasts of trials involving potential 
gains and potential losses (Charity-Gain $4 > Charity-Loss $4, or 
Charity-Loss $4 > Charity-Gain $4) revealed no clusters of activa-
tion that survived whole-volume correction.
Playing for Self vs. playing for charity
We next identiﬁ  ed regions that exhibited signiﬁ  cant differences in 
activation depending on whether participants were anticipating 
playing for themselves or for their charity. The direct contrast of 
self-directed gains greater than charity-directed gains (Self-Gain 
$4 > Charity-Gain $4) identiﬁ  ed activations similar to those found 
for self-gains (i.e., Self-Gain $4 > Self-Gain $0); i.e., within reward-
related regions like the NAcc and VTA. Activation in these regions 
was greatest to self-directed rewards, intermediate to   charity-
directed rewards, and least on trials where no reward could be 
obtained. Additional regions whose activation increased to self-
directed gains (Table 5) included the prefrontal cortex,   temporal–
parietal–occipital junction (TPO), and posterior insula/inferior 
parietal lobule (IPL). Likewise, the direct contrast of self-directed 
losses greater than charity-directed losses (Self-Loss $4 > Charity-
Loss $4, Table 6) evoked activation in reward-related regions, along 
with additional clusters in the TPO and IPL.
The only region exhibiting greater charity-directed activation 
than self-directed activation was the posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC). This activation survived whole-volume correction for the 
loss trials (Charity-Loss $4 > Self-Loss $4, Table 7), but not for the 
gain trials (Charity-Gain $4 > Loss-Gain $4; z = 2.8 for coordinates: 
2, −56, −18).
fMRI RESULTS: ROI ANALYSIS
Anticipatory activations in the VTA and NAcc are similar 
for self and charity
We deﬁ ned ROIs in the VTA and NAcc, collapsed across hemi-
spheres (see Section “Materials and Methods” for details). For each 
Table 4 | Charity, Lose $4 > Lose $0.
 Peak  (x, y, z)  Z-max
Ventral striatum  22, 6, 2  4.35
Right insula/operculum  32, 16, 8  4.2
Ventral striatum  −18, 14, 2  4.11
Midbrain  −6, −18, −2 4.12
Thalamus 8,  −10, 4  4.04
Visual cortex  0, −76, 4  4.04
Ventral striatum  −22, 0, 2  4.05
Thalamus 8,  −22, 0  4.13
Ventral striatum  −18, 16, −4 4.08
Ventral striatum  22, 20, −6 4.2
Ten maximum cluster peaks, Z-cluster threshold 4.035. Coordinates are 
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subject, we calculated parameter estimates for each ROI and reward 
type within a two-factor (beneﬁ  ciary: Self vs. Charity; valence: gain 
vs. loss) repeated measures ANOVA. Note that for each trial type, 
we subtracted the mean activation associated with the matched 
$0-reward trial (e.g., Self-Gain $4 minus Self-gain $0), to control 
for non-task-related processing (e.g., cue perception).
We found that both VTA and NAcc showed greater activation to 
self-directed rewards compared to charity-directed rewards [VTA: 
F(1, 13) = 7.41, p < 0.05; NAcc: F(1, 13) = 12.31, p < 0.05] though on 
average activations were positive in both the VTA [F(1,13) = 70.14, 
p < 0.05] and NAcc [F(1,13) = 79.97, p < 0.05]. Neither the VTA nor 
the NAcc ROIs showed signiﬁ  cant main effect of valence though 
the VTA did exhibit a trend [Gain vs. Loss, F(1,13) = 3.96 p = 0.07]. 
However, the VTA did show a signiﬁ  cant effect of valence that scaled 
with our Reward Sensitivity covariate [Gain vs. Loss × Reward 
Sensitivity, F(1,13) = 5.74, p < 0.05]. Although the NAcc did not 
show any main effects or direct interactions of valence, it did show 
a three-way interaction incorporating an effect of valence [Self 
vs. Charity × Gain vs. Loss × Reward Sensitivity, F(1,13) = 5.81, 
p = 0.031; Figure 4]. We also note that we found no signiﬁ  cant 
FIGURE 3 | Whole-brain analysis reveals similar patterns of activation 
during anticipation of gains and losses, whether participants played for 
self or a charity. Activated regions were larger and more signiﬁ  cant in the Self 
conditions. Activation peaks were present in the NAcc and VTA in all four 
treatments (i.e., anticipating gain, anticipating loss, playing for self, playing for a 
charity). ROIs for bilateral NAcc (A and B, top) are shown on a coronal image 
(y = −12). The ROI for the VTA (A and B, bottom) is shown on a magniﬁ  ed axial 
image (z = −12). ROIs are indicated in white on an anatomical image to the left 
of the statistical maps. The left side of each image corresponds to the 
participant’s left. All statistical map colors reﬂ  ect the Z-score color scale in the 
upper right corner. Other signiﬁ  cant peaks in each condition are listed in 
Tables 1–4.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 21  |  8
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differences in these regions between mean signal changes in the $0 
conditions, indicating that these effects are contingent upon the 
presence of anticipated reward.
To assess the localization of each ROI and test for potential spatial 
inhomogeneity, we also restricted our analyses to the   single voxel 
with the highest Z-score (i.e., most signiﬁ  cant) to self-directed gains 
within the NAcc (MNI coordinates: 12, 6, −6) and VTA (MNI coor-
dinates: 4, −16, −10) ROIs. Results of these ANOVAs are consistent 
with the results of the whole ROI ANOVAs in both the VTA and NAcc 
with two exceptions. In the NAcc, the three-way interaction present 
in the complete NAcc ROI (Gain vs. Loss × Reward Sensitivity) was 
non-signiﬁ  cant for the peak voxel alone [F(1,13) = 2.38, p = 0.15]. 
Second, in the VTA, the peak reward-anticipation-sensitive 
voxel showed a signiﬁ  cant main effect of valence [Gain vs. Loss: 
F(1,13) = 8.30, p < 0.05], an effect only signiﬁ  cant at the trend level 
in the analysis of the complete VTA ROI. Note that this increase in 
signiﬁ  cance may simply reﬂ  ect a selection bias, given that this voxel 
was selected for its robust responses in the self-gain condition. As 
further conﬁ  rmation of a motivational salience signal, signiﬁ  cant 
increases in activation to self-directed losses, to charity-directed 
gains, and to charity-directed losses were also present in the whole-
brain analysis from this voxel. In addition, there were no voxels in 
the VTA or NAcc that showed negative activity on loss trials (with 
respect to the $0 condition) across participants.
Recent work by Matsumoto and Hikosaka (2009) indicates 
there are two varieties of dopaminergic neurons in the VTA, one 
population that responds to positive conditions and one popu-
lation that responds to both positive and negative conditions. 
With this in mind we also interrogated voxels in the VTA (MNI 
coordinates: −10, −16, −12) and NAcc (MNI coordinates: −12, 
10, −6) that showed the peak activation increase (i.e., greatest 
Z-score) during anticipation on loss trials. The NAcc loss peak 
results were consistent with those of the complete ROI and gain 
peak in that they showed a positive average response in all con-
ditions, a main effect of beneﬁ  ciary, a trend toward an effect of 
participant reward sensitivity, and signiﬁ  cant three-way inter-
action of Self vs. Charity × Gain vs. Loss × Reward Sensitivity. 
Consistent with Matsumoto and Hikosaka, the peak loss voxel 
in the VTA differed from the peak gain voxel in that it exhibited 
no signiﬁ  cant main effect of valence [F(1,13) = 0.713, p = 0.41]. 
We caution that these analyses do not directly test spatial inho-
mogeneity effects and that such results may be attributable to 
selection bias because although our initial deﬁ  nition of ROIs 
was independent, deﬁ  nitions of the peak voxels was based on 
non-independent tests.
Individual gain and loss anticipation traits in the NAcc and VTA
In the current study, a main effect of affective valence would mani-
fest in increased activation for anticipation of gains and decreased 
activation for anticipation of losses (or vice versa). Conversely, a 
main effect of motivation would lead to increased activation for 
anticipation of both gains and losses, compared to trials without 
the possibility of reward. As described above, our whole-volume 
analyses provided no suggestions of opposite responses for gains 
and losses within reward-related regions; to the contrary, we found 
that gains and losses each evoked signiﬁ  cant increases in activa-
tion within the NAcc and VTA, among other regions. We repeated 
these analyses for our anatomically deﬁ  ned ROIs and found a simi-
lar result: increased activation for both gain and loss trials, with 
greater activation for self-directed compared to charity-directed 
trials. Thus, we found no evidence for group-level main effects of 
valence in our target regions.
Table 5 | Self-Gain $4 > Charity-Gain $4.
 Peak  (x, y, z)  Z-max
Left prefrontal cortex  −22, 56, −4 3.5
  −33, 46, 14  3.1
  −8, 36, 18  3.3
Right temporal–parietal–occipital junction  46, −60, 2  4.09
Left temporal–parietal–occipital junction  −50, −68, −6 3.8
Right inferior parietal lobule  46, −26, 12  3.6
Left inferior parietal lobule  −35, −28, 16  3.7
The peaks listed are only signiﬁ  cantly active when playing for self.
Table 6 | Self-Lose $4 > Charity-Lose $4.
 Peak  (x, y, z)  Z-max
Right temporal–parietal–occipital junction  44, −68, −8 3.8
Left temporal–parietal–occipital junction  −48, −68, −4 4.1
Right inferior parietal lobule  49, −47, 16  3.3
Left inferior parietal lobule  −62, −24, 24  4.0
The peaks listed are only signiﬁ  cantly active when playing for self.
Table 7 | Charity-Lose $4 > Self-Lose $4.
  K (voxels)  Peak (x, y, z)  Z-max
Posterior cingulate cortex  272  −4, −50, 20  3.45
FIGURE 4 | Percent signal change in the NAcc and VTA for $4 vs. $0 trials. 
Mean activations, relative to $0 conditions, were positive for all trial types. 
Activations were larger in the Self than Charity treatment condition, reﬂ  ecting 
reliable differences on both gain and loss runs. A trend for a main effect of 
valence was present in the VTA but not the NAcc. Valence effects that are 
modulated by the reward sensitivity of the participant were present in both 
regions. We found no signiﬁ  cant differences between $0 conditions. Error 
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We next investigated whether there were any across-subjects 
relationships between the magnitude of the responses to gain and 
loss trials. If there were a negative correlation across individuals 
between activations to gain and loss trials, even though the mean 
activation for both types of trials was positive, then that would be 
strong evidence that both motivation and affective valence modu-
late activation in reward-related regions. Alternatively, a positive 
correlation between activations to gain and loss trials would provide 
evidence in favor of a motivational explanation, alone. Our results 
support the motivation explanation. In the NAcc, activations during 
gain anticipation scaled positively with loss anticipation (Figure 5), 
with a signiﬁ  cant correlation in self-directed-trials (r = 0.64) and 
a non-signiﬁ  cant but numerically positive correlation on charity-
directed trials. In the VTA (Figure 6), activations during gain and 
loss anticipation were positively correlated for both self-directed 
(r = 0.58) and charity-directed (r = 0.63) trials.
We next used a hierarchical regression analysis to evaluate 
whether the neural bias toward gains, compared to losses, was pre-
dicted by our reward sensitivity covariate. We found that there were 
strong correlations between reward sensitivity and the   differential 
activation between gains and losses (e.g., Self-Gain $4 minus 
Self-Loss $4) in both the NAcc and VTA (Figures 5A and 6A). 
Individuals who had the greatest reward sensitivity exhibited the 
greatest relative increment in activation gains compared to losses. 
(We note that this is a fully independent correlation, in that we are 
using an independent behavioral test, an anatomical ROI, and the 
residual activation following a contrast of conditions.) This effect 
was signiﬁ  cant for self-directed trials in both NAcc and VTA, but 
not for charity-directed trials in either ROI. We conducted simi-
lar analyses using covariates for other-regarding preferences and 
behavioral inhibition, and found no signiﬁ  cant effects. Based on 
these results, we conducted a post hoc test looking at the relation-
ship between our reward sensitivity covariate and activation to 
each trial type (as opposed to the difference between trial types 
described above). We found that, within our sample, the NAcc and 
VTA responses to self-directed gains were largely similar regard-
less of reward sensitivity, but that high reward-sensitivity scores 
correlated with a relative decrease in activation on the other trial 
FIGURE 5 | BOLD responses in the NAcc during gain and loss anticipation 
are positively correlated when participants play for themselves. Top: 
Average percent signal change differences (paid-control) for anticipation of gain 
and loss trials for the Self (left) and Charity (right) treatments. Each point is 
colored according to the participant’s relative reward sensitivity index 
(z transformed). Bottom: Individual Gain vs. Loss signal change differences are 
plotted against the participant’s reward sensitivity index (z transformed). Each 
plot includes the orthogonal distance regression best ﬁ  t line, as well as the 
correlation coefﬁ  cient (r) and the p-value of that correlation (p). Only the 
regression in the Self condition was signiﬁ  cant.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 21  |  10
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types (Figure 7; see also colored circles on the upper right panels 
of Figures 5 and 6).
DISCUSSION
We examined brain activation during the anticipation of mon-
etary rewards that varied in their valence (i.e., gain vs. loss) and 
beneﬁ  ciary (i.e., self-directed vs. charity-directed). We found that 
activation in putatively reward-related regions, speciﬁ  cally the 
NAcc and VTA, increased during both gain- and loss-anticipation, 
with greater responses to self-directed than charity-directed trials. 
Moreover, there was a strong positive correlation between these 
responses across individuals, such that those individuals with the 
greatest anticipatory response to potential gains also had the great-
est response to potential losses. Together, these results indicate that 
anticipatory activation reﬂ  ects the motivational properties of the 
potential reward, not its valence. However, we found evidence, using 
an independent behavioral covariate, that individual differences 
in reward sensitivity modulated the relative response to gains and 
losses, with more reward-sensitive individuals exhibiting relatively 
more activation to gains compared to losses. Below, we consider 
the implications of each of these results.
REWARD ANTICIPATION: MOTIVATION VS. VALENCE
In group analyses, we found no evidence that anticipatory activations 
in either VTA or NAcc reﬂ  ect a univariate value signal that scales 
according to both the valence and magnitude of the potential reward 
(i.e., gain > neutral > loss). Both potential gains and potential losses 
evoked increased activation compared to control stimuli in the NAcc 
and VTA, as shown within a whole-volume analysis, an anatomical 
ROI analysis, and in an analysis restricted to the most-active voxel 
in each region. And, as even stronger evidence that anticipatory 
activations reﬂ  ect motivational salience, we found that activations 
associated with gains and with losses were positively correlated 
across participants. These results lie in contrast to some previous 
studies that have shown increased NAcc activation to anticipated 
gains, compared to anticipated losses(Knutson et al., 2001), or have 
FIGURE 6 | BOLD responses in the VTA during the anticipation of gain and 
loss are positively correlated whether participants play for themselves or 
for a charity. Top: Average percent signal change differences (paid-control) for 
anticipation of gain and loss trials for the Self (left) and Charity (right) 
treatments. Each point is colored according to the participant’s relative reward 
sensitivity index (z transformed). Gain and loss responses differences are 
positively correlated in both the self and charity conditions. Bottom: Individual 
Gain vs. Loss signal change differences are plotted against the participant’s 
reward sensitivity index (z transformed). Each plot includes the orthogonal 
distance regression best ﬁ  t line, as well as the correlation coefﬁ  cient (r) and the 
p-value of that correlation (p). Only the regression in the Self condition was 
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failed to ﬁ  nd increased activation to anticipated losses compared to a 
neutral control condition (Knutson et al., 2003, 2008a). For example, 
a study of loss aversion by Tom et al. (2007) showed that activation 
in the vSTR to decisions about mixed gambles (i.e., that involved 
a potential gain and a potential loss) increased with increased size 
of gain, but decreased with increasing size of loss. This result was 
interpreted as reﬂ  ecting the response of a single reward mechanism 
that codes for both gains and losses along a single axis of reward 
value. We note that gains and losses were always paired in the design 
of Tom et al. (2007), such that the magnitude of the loss attenuated 
the overall value (i.e., magnitude) of the gamble. Within our study, 
in contrast, the potential losses were presented in isolation and thus 
reﬂ  ected an independent and negative potential outcome, allowing 
a differentiation between magnitude and valence.
Prior research has suggested that under certain conditions 
NAcc activation reﬂ  ects task factors other than value of a poten-
tial reward. Activation in the NAcc has been reported to correlate 
with both the salience of the stimulus presented (Zink et al., 2003) 
as well as the unpredictability of the potential outcome (Berns 
et al., 2001). It could be argued that salience or risk are inherently 
rewarding. However, there is also evidence that NAcc responses 
positively correlate with aversive stimuli (Delgado et al., 2004; 
Jensen et al., 2007; Salamone et al., 2007; Levita et al., 2009), as 
well.. In the current study, although activations to gain and loss 
anticipation both exceeded those present during all control condi-
tions ($0), we found evidence that reward valence modulates the 
amplitude of this activation in the NAcc and VTA. In the VTA we 
found valence modulations related to reward sensitivity. In the 
NAcc modulation of valence was dependent on both the beneﬁ  ci-
ary of the reward and the reward sensitivity of the participant. One 
reasonable possibility is that the VTA and NAcc are primarily sen-
sitive to aspects of motivational salience but that those responses 
FIGURE 7 | BOLD responses in the Self-Gain condition are unrelated to 
reward sensitivity. BOLD responses ($4 > $0) in both the NAcc (white 
circle) and VTA (black triangles) were anticorrelated with reward sensitivity 
across subjects except in the Self-Gain condition (NAcc self-gain: r = 0.06, 
p = 0.81; VTA self-gain: r = 0.11, p = 0.68; NAcc charity-gain: r = −0.72, 
p = 0.001; VTA charity-gain: r = −0.58, p = 0.01; NAcc self-loss: 
r = −0.57 , p = 0.02; VTA self-loss: r = −0.50, p = 0.04; NAcc charity-loss: 
r = −0.51, p = 0.04; VTA charity-loss: r = −0.58, p = 0.02). Solid lines indicate 
signiﬁ  cant regressions. Dashed lines indicate regressions that were 
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are modulated by affective valence (Cooper and Knutson, 2008), 
especially in those participants who are most reward sensitive. 
The relative strength of affective valence modulation would then 
likely be dependent upon task context. This mixed signal may 
also reﬂ  ect spatial inhomogeneity within the VTA and NAcc, as 
discussed below.
A striking result came from the imperfect matching between 
the neurometric responses to potential gains and to potential 
losses. While the gain:loss ratio across the entire subject sample 
was approximately 1:1, some subjects showed a relatively increased 
response to gains, while others showed a relatively increased 
response to losses. This residual variation turned out to be sys-
tematically related to participants’ reward-sensitivity scores. This 
behavior–brain correlation could reﬂ  ect a contribution of some 
subcomponent of these reward-related regions, or the inﬂ  uence 
of another region that itself was sensitive to affective valence. An 
important direction for future research will be identifying the 
pattern of functional connectivity across regions that predict both 
trial-to-trial effects of cue value and across-subjects factors that 
bias those value signals.
THE ROLE OF THE VTA IN REWARD ANTICIPATION
Most prior neuroimaging studies of reward processing have 
focused on the vSTR, speciﬁ  cally the NAcc, which has been reli-
ably reported to exhibit increased activation during anticipation. 
Much less evidence exists for the modulatory effects of anticipa-
tion in the VTA, the primary dopaminergic input to the NAcc 
(Swanson, 1982; Ikemoto, 2007). Prior research on VTA function, 
mostly using single-unit recording in non-human primates, has 
implicated that region in the processing of rewards, generally, 
and in transient responses to changing reward expectations 
(Ljungberg et al., 1992). Based on data showing that VTA neu-
rons respond to both unexpected primary rewards and cues that 
predict future rewards, it has been theorized that these neurons 
code a reward prediction error, critical for TD learning (Schultz 
et al., 1997). It would be difﬁ  cult to account for our results using 
prediction error signals that treat gains and losses as a single con-
tinuum. Because we separated our gain and loss cues into sepa-
rate blocks, and used two types of rewards, a single continuum 
prediction error model would predict that we should observe 
the greatest anticipatory responses to Self-Gain cues, smallest 
(or most negative) responses to Self-Loss cues, responses in the 
same directions, but possibly attenuated, to both types of Charity 
cues, and minimal responses to the non-rewarded control cues. 
In contrast, we found very similar activation, both in spatial pat-
tern and amplitude, for anticipated gains and anticipated losses, 
with both gains and losses greater than control cues or charitable 
cues. Alternatively, the opportunity to avoid losses may be might 
be seen as rewarding. In fact, there is evidence that relief from 
pain (Seymour et al., 2005) and even avoiding potential negative 
outcomes (Kim et al., 2006) can be viewed as rewards. However, 
this kind of “pure valence” explanation is inconsistent with the 
observation that activations on loss trials were still greater than 
neutral ($0) trials.
We emphasize that these results are not necessarily incom-
patible with the numerous prior demonstrations that predic-
tion errors modulate the responses of VTA neurons, for three 
  reasons. First, as is proposed by Seymour et al. (2007), there may 
be   multiple and potentially valence-dependent prediction error 
signals. That is, separate neuronal prediction-error signals may 
increase in   anticipation of gains and of losses, each contributing 
to observed BOLD   activation. Second, monetary losses may not 
have similar psychological and neural effects as omitted primary 
rewards or aversive stimuli. In particular, the loss of money reﬂ  ects 
an opportunity cost that affects the total value of a future reward, 
rather than an immediate negative consequence (e.g., a painful 
shock). Accordingly, humans frequently reframe decision prob-
lems to minimize decision difﬁ  culty or to maximize perceived 
value (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974); in our paradigm, like many 
others, the loss cue may have been reframed as an opportunity to 
avoid negative consequences. Third, activation measured using 
fMRI does not necessarily map onto the ﬁ  ring rate of individual 
neurons. Substantial methodological work suggests that the ampli-
tude of BOLD activation matches best to local ﬁ  eld potential and 
multi-unit activity within a region (Goense and Logothetis, 2008), 
and less well to single-unit activity. The relatively coarse times-
cale of fMRI data collection, combined with the ﬁ  ltering effects 
of the BOLD hemodynamic response, precludes determination 
of the relative timing of the contributing neuronal activity. In 
addition, evidence from Ungless et al. (2004) indicates the VTA 
may not be homogenous in its responsiveness to gain and loss. 
They ﬁ  nd evidence of two distinct populations of neurons in the 
VTA, one responsive to positive stimuli and the other to aversive 
stimuli. Inhomogeneity in the VTA within dopaminergic neurons 
is supported in recent work by Matsumoto and Hikosaka (2009) 
who show not only distinct populations of neurons responsive 
to positively valenced stimuli but also provide evidence of a dor-
sal/ventral spatial distinction. Preliminary ﬁ  ndings in the cur-
rent study suggest that an fMRI study designed to look for spatial 
separation of gain-speciﬁ  c neuronal populations in the VTA may 
be able to isolate them from those responsive to both gains and 
losses. Given these caveats, our results should be interpreted as 
showing that some aspect of information processing in VTA is 
driven by motivational properties of anticipated rewards or by a 
prediction error that increases with the magnitude of anticipated 
punishment. We also note that individuals who are more reward 
sensitive display effects of valence not present in those relatively 
less sensitive to reward.
MODULATION OF ANTICIPATORY REWARD SIGNALS BY 
SELF- VS. OTHER-DIRECTED CONTEXT
The NAcc not only responds to meaningful self-directed outcomes, 
it also responds to a variety of other-directed outcomes: social 
cooperation (Rilling et al., 2002), altruistic punishment (Singer 
et al., 2006), and rewards for a favored charity (Moll et al., 2006; 
Harbaugh et al., 2007), among others. In these latter cases, the 
reward may be emulated as if it were being personally received 
and is therefore represented within the same system, albeit with 
reduced magnitude. We note that prior research showing activation 
in the reward system to charitable rewards used tasks involving 
active decisions or passive receipt of those rewards. Here, we show 
that mere anticipation of potential reward is sufﬁ  cient to evoke 
activation within the NAcc; moreover, like the work of Moll et al., 
we extend our conclusions to include VTA, as well.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 21  |  13
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Notably, all of our main-effect analyses indicated that self-
directed and charity-directed rewards evoked very similar pat-
terns of activation: for both types of rewards, activation in the 
NAcc and VTA increased for both anticipated gains and anticipated 
losses. What differentiated these two reward types was our partici-
pants’ relative reward sensitivity, such that individuals with higher 
reward-sensitive individuals showed lower responses for all chari-
table rewards. Somewhat surprisingly, we found no similar across-
 participant effect of our other-regarding-preference covariate. We 
note that prior studies have shown that the relative subjective 
value of different charitable rewards, deﬁ  ned by the participant’s 
willingness to engage in a transaction as opposed to individual 
differences in overall other-regarding-preferences, modulates acti-
vation of the vSTR (Moll et al., 2006; Harbaugh et al., 2007). In 
contrast, self-reported trait measures of other-regarding prefer-
ences have been reported to relate to structural (Yamasue et al., 
2008) and functional (Tankersley et al., 2007) differences in other 
brain regions associated with social cognition. The independence 
of other-regarding preferences and likelihood of engaging in a 
charitable transaction is worthy of further investigation.
We have presented evidence that motivational salience modu-
lates activation in the VTA and NAcc. Activations during the antici-
pation phase of all trial types were positive with respect to a $0 trial. 
However, the magnitude of this positive activation was modulated 
by three factors. First, the beneﬁ  ciary: activations were smaller in 
magnitude when the outcome of the trial was not directed toward 
the participant, suggesting that a single system processes social 
and personal rewards according to their motivational salience. 
Second, the valence: in the VTA, the anticipation of gains evokes 
greater activation than the anticipation of losses, even though both 
conditions are greater than trials where no reward or punishment 
could be obtained. Third, the reward sensitivity of the individual: 
for participants who are more reward sensitive, the magnitude of 
activations to anticipation in the VTA and NAcc is largest on gain 
trials played for themselves. We conclude that both the VTA and 
NAcc provide anticipatory signals that largely reﬂ  ect the motiva-
tional signiﬁ  cance of potential rewards.
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